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A huge arc of charged particles breaks free from the Sun 
and hurtles millions of miles toward Earth. Within hours it 
hits Earth’s magnetic field, which compresses under the 
onslaught. The changing magnetic fields induce electrical 
current on power lines that crisscross the landscape. These 
geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) snowball, causing 
magnetic saturation and overheating in power transformers. 
The protective electrical insulation of vital transformer sys-
tems that form the nodes of the U.S. power grid is damaged by 
the overheating until the transformer insulation finally breaks 
down, resulting in an internal flashover. For an event of suf-
ficient magnitude that affects the electric grid over a wide 
area, transformers connected to the longer lines can be ex-
pected to fail. With multiple power lines in play and because 
of the deep interconnectivity of the power grid, like lined-
up dominos, one transformer after another falters and fails. 
Failure rates quickly exceed the available reserve of spare 
transformers (any utility’s typical infrastructure includes a 
3–5% reserve to account for the 0.75% average annual failure 
rate of these systems). Suddenly, a mere space weather dis-
turbance has evolved into a catastrophe: replacing hundreds 
of burnt-out transformers in the U.S. power grid could leave 
millions without power for months, perhaps years, leading to 
economic losses in the trillions of dollars. 
Tasked by the Department of Homeland Security, JA-
SON [2011] recently published a study that assesses the 
likelihood of a so-called “Kappenman worst-case scenario” 
[Kappenman, 2003], such as the one described above, focus-
ing on space weather effects on the electrical grid. The JA-
SON report also discusses how previous solar storms have 
affected power grids and what can be done to protect the U.S. 
electrical grid. Our ability to predict the interactions of two 
complex systems, space weather and the U.S. power grid, is 
clearly crucial to mitigating these dangers.
As an independent scientific advisory group that has pro-
vided consulting services to the U.S. government on matters 
of defense, science, and technology since 1960, JASON pres-
ents many findings and recommendations in this report that 
will sound familiar to the space weather community: There 
has been tremendous progress in space weather research and 
prediction capability. The primary drivers leading to GIC 
events are rather well understood, but predictions are depen-
dent on aging research satellites (ACE, STEREO, etc.) rather 
than on a robust national infrastructure that is equipped to 
take advantage of the strengths of the participating agencies, 
such as the U.S. Department of Defense, NASA, and NOAA. 
Some key recommendations to rebuild the space weather in-
frastructure are straightforward, while others that deal with 
the alignment and relative roles of these agencies may be 
controversial and will require multiagency engagement and 
coordination to implement. 
The biggest question addressed by this report concerns 
the likelihood that a major space weather event will cata-
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A step-up transformer typically located at power plants used 
to get the power out of the plant and into the transmission 
grid. These are potentially vulnerable assets during a GIC 
event and would fail en masse should a Kappenman worst-
case scenario unfold. Photo courtesy of Haukur Asgeirsson. 
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strophically affect the U.S. power grid. The report answers, 
“We agree that the U.S. electric grid remains vulnerable, but 
are not convinced that Kappenman’s worst-case scenario is 
plausible…” This statement is based primarily on the fact 
that we simply do not know enough about how the power 
grid will respond under extreme space weather conditions. 
However, JASON’s conclusion is not based on information 
that would exclude the catastrophic scenario from consider-
ation. In fact, it may be surprising to an uninitiated reader of 
the report to learn that basic GIC protection mechanisms for 
important transformer assets have not already been imple-
mented in the U.S. power system, even though other coun-
tries, such as Finland and Canada, have found it prudent, 
indeed necessary, to protect their systems and deploy pro-
tecting relays.
When interviewed, technology leaders of one U.S. pow-
er company as well as government agencies that deal with 
multiple power companies revealed the pressures on tech-
nologists not to include any mechanisms that might hurt the 
reliability of the power grid. Relays that are supposed to pro-
tect the transformers can register false warnings that shut off 
power when there is no actual danger to the system. Such 
unwarranted shutoffs are, of course, costly to the power com-
panies and to the U.S. economy. This makes power compa-
nies extra sensitive to introducing any technologies, such as 
new GIC transformer protector relays, that might exacerbate 
such problems.
The top three worries of the power company do not cur-
rently include space weather, although they do acknowledge 
the urgent need for a better and more comprehensive under-
standing of the power grid. The power company recognizes 
that the grid is deeply interconnected and can amplify pertur-
bations from localized sources. A key recommendation of the 
JASON report is to create such a comprehensive simulation 
of the electrical grid that would generate much-needed data 
and enable a properly quantitative and reassuring assessment 
of the likelihood of Kappenman’s worst-case scenario.
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